Certain run-time memory protection mechanisms in the GNU C Library (aka glibc or libc6) print argv[0] and backtrace information, which might allow context-dependent attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory by executing an incorrect program, as demonstrated by a setuid program that contains a stack-based buffer overflow error, related to the __fortify_fail function in debug/fortify_fail.c, and the __stack_chk_fail (aka stack protection) and __chk_fail (aka FORTIFY_SOURCE) implementations.
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
Link | Tags |
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http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/09/02/3 | mailing list |
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/09/02/5 | mailing list |
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Apr/399 | third party advisory mailing list |
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/09/02/2 | mailing list |
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/08/31/7 | mailing list |
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/09/02/4 | mailing list |
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/08/31/6 | mailing list |
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/08/25/8 | mailing list |