The request phase of the OmniAuth Ruby gem (1.9.1 and earlier) is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery when used as part of the Ruby on Rails framework, allowing accounts to be connected without user intent, user interaction, or feedback to the user. This permits a secondary account to be able to sign into the web application as the primary account.
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
Link | Tags |
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https://github.com/omniauth/omniauth/pull/809 | third party advisory patch |
https://github.com/omniauth/omniauth-rails/pull/1 | third party advisory |
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/05/26/11 | mailing list third party advisory patch |
https://github.com/omniauth/omniauth/wiki/Resolving-CVE-2015-9284 | third party advisory mitigation |