In PHP before 5.6.28 and 7.x before 7.0.13, incorrect handling of various URI components in the URL parser could be used by attackers to bypass hostname-specific URL checks, as demonstrated by evil.example.com:80#@good.example.com/ and evil.example.com:80?@good.example.com/ inputs to the parse_url function (implemented in the php_url_parse_ex function in ext/standard/url.c).
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
Link | Tags |
---|---|
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/07/10/6 | mailing list third party advisory patch |
http://php.net/ChangeLog-5.php | release notes vendor advisory |
https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20180112-0001/ | |
http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git%3Ba=commit%3Bh=b061fa909de77085d3822a89ab901b934d0362c4 | |
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/99552 | vdb entry |
http://php.net/ChangeLog-7.php | release notes vendor advisory |
https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=73192 | issue tracking third party advisory |