On Windows endpoints, the SecureConnector agent must run under the local SYSTEM account or another administrator account in order to enable full functionality of the agent. The typical configuration is for the agent to run as a Windows service under the local SYSTEM account. The SecureConnector agent runs various plugin scripts and executables on the endpoint in order to gather and report information about the host to the CounterACT management appliance. The SecureConnector agent downloads these scripts and executables as needed from the CounterACT management appliance and runs them on the endpoint. The SecureConnector agent fails to set any permissions on downloaded file objects. This allows a malicious user to take ownership of any of these files and make modifications to it, regardless of where the files are saved. These files are then executed under SYSTEM privileges. A malicious unprivileged user can overwrite these executable files with malicious code before the SecureConnector agent executes them, causing the malicious code to be run under the SYSTEM account.
Solution:
Opening temporary files without appropriate measures or controls can leave the file, its contents and any function that it impacts vulnerable to attack.
Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/768331 | third party advisory us government resource |
| http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/94740 | vdb entry third party advisory |