In Teeworlds before 0.6.5, connection packets could be forged. There was no challenge-response involved in the connection build up. A remote attacker could send connection packets from a spoofed IP address and occupy all server slots, or even use them for a reflection attack using map download packets.
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
Link | Tags |
---|---|
https://teeworlds.com/?page=news&id=12544 | vendor advisory |
https://github.com/teeworlds/teeworlds/issues/1536 | patch vendor advisory |
https://bugs.debian.org/911487 | mailing list third party advisory patch |
https://www.debian.org/security/2018/dsa-4329 | third party advisory vendor advisory |
http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-07/msg00046.html | vendor advisory |
http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-08/msg00077.html | vendor advisory |