keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for existing plain files when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. If a local attacker had previously created a file with the expected name (e.g., /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats), with read access for the attacker and write access for the keepalived process, then this potentially leaked sensitive information.
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
Link | Tags |
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https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201903-01 | third party advisory vendor advisory |
https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1015141 | issue tracking third party advisory |
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/issues/1048 | third party advisory patch |