An out-of-bounds read in dns_validate_dns_response in dns.c was discovered in HAProxy through 1.8.14. Due to a missing check when validating DNS responses, remote attackers might be able read the 16 bytes corresponding to an AAAA record from the non-initialized part of the buffer, possibly accessing anything that was left on the stack, or even past the end of the 8193-byte buffer, depending on the value of accepted_payload_size.
The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| http://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy.git%3Ba=commit%3Bh=efbbdf72992cd20458259962346044cafd9331c0 | |
| https://usn.ubuntu.com/3858-1/ | third party advisory vendor advisory |
| https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2019:0326 | third party advisory vendor advisory |
| http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106223 | third party advisory vdb entry |
| https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2019:0327 | third party advisory vendor advisory |
| https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:1436 | vendor advisory |
| https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/05/msg00045.html | mailing list |