wolfSSL and wolfCrypt 4.0.0 and earlier (when configured without --enable-fpecc, --enable-sp, or --enable-sp-math) contain a timing side channel in ECDSA signature generation. This allows a local attacker, able to precisely measure the duration of signature operations, to infer information about the nonces used and potentially mount a lattice attack to recover the private key used. The issue occurs because ecc.c scalar multiplication might leak the bit length.
The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor, which exposes security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.
Link | Tags |
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https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf | third party advisory technical description |
https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7337 | third party advisory technical description |
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/02/2 | third party advisory mailing list |
https://minerva.crocs.fi.muni.cz/ | product |