Crypto++ 8.3.0 and earlier contains a timing side channel in ECDSA signature generation. This allows a local or remote attacker, able to measure the duration of hundreds to thousands of signing operations, to compute the private key used. The issue occurs because scalar multiplication in ecp.cpp (prime field curves, small leakage) and algebra.cpp (binary field curves, large leakage) is not constant time and leaks the bit length of the scalar among other information.
Weaknesses in this category are related to improper handling of communication channels and access paths. These weaknesses include problems in creating, managing, or removing alternate channels and alternate paths. Some of these can overlap virtual file problems and are commonly used in "bypass" attacks, such as those that exploit authentication errors.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf | third party advisory exploit |
| https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7337 | third party advisory |
| https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp/issues/869 | third party advisory patch |
| http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-08/msg00066.html | vendor advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/02/2 | mailing list |
| https://minerva.crocs.fi.muni.cz/ |