In FreeBSD 11.3-PRERELEASE and 12.0-STABLE before r347591, 11.2-RELEASE before 11.2-RELEASE-p10, and 12.0-RELEASE before 12.0-RELEASE-p4, a bug in the pf IPv6 fragment reassembly logic incorrectly uses the last extension header offset from the last received packet instead of the first packet allowing maliciously crafted IPv6 packets to cause a crash or potentially bypass the packet filter.
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
Link | Tags |
---|---|
https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-19:05.pf.asc | patch vendor advisory |
https://www.synacktiv.com/ressources/Synacktiv_OpenBSD_PacketFilter_CVE-2019-5597_ipv6_frag.pdf | third party advisory exploit |
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152933/FreeBSD-Security-Advisory-FreeBSD-SA-19-05.pf.html | third party advisory vdb entry |
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/108395 | vdb entry |
https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20190611-0001/ | |
https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujul2019-5072835.html |