In OctoberCMS before version 1.0.468, encrypted cookie values were not tied to the name of the cookie the value belonged to. This meant that certain classes of attacks that took advantage of other theoretical vulnerabilities in user facing code (nothing exploitable in the core project itself) had a higher chance of succeeding. Specifically, if your usage exposed a way for users to provide unfiltered user input and have it returned to them as an encrypted cookie (ex. storing a user provided search query in a cookie) they could then use the generated cookie in place of other more tightly controlled cookies; or if your usage exposed the plaintext version of an encrypted cookie at any point to the user they could theoretically provide encrypted content from your application back to it as an encrypted cookie and force the framework to decrypt it for them. Issue has been fixed in build 468 (v1.0.468).
The product relies on the existence or values of cookies when performing security-critical operations, but it does not properly ensure that the setting is valid for the associated user.
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/octobercms/october/security/advisories/GHSA-55mm-5399-7r63 | third party advisory |
| https://github.com/octobercms/library/pull/508 | third party advisory patch |
| https://github.com/octobercms/library/commit/28310d4fb336a1741b39498f4474497644a6875c | third party advisory patch |