Bubblewrap (bwrap) before version 0.4.1, if installed in setuid mode and the kernel supports unprivileged user namespaces, then the `bwrap --userns2` option can be used to make the setuid process keep running as root while being traceable. This can in turn be used to gain root permissions. Note that this only affects the combination of bubblewrap in setuid mode (which is typically used when unprivileged user namespaces are not supported) and the support of unprivileged user namespaces. Known to be affected are: * Debian testing/unstable, if unprivileged user namespaces enabled (not default) * Debian buster-backports, if unprivileged user namespaces enabled (not default) * Arch if using `linux-hardened`, if unprivileged user namespaces enabled (not default) * Centos 7 flatpak COPR, if unprivileged user namespaces enabled (not default) This has been fixed in the 0.4.1 release, and all affected users should update.
The product does not conform to the API requirements for a function call that requires extra privileges. This could allow attackers to gain privileges by causing the function to be called incorrectly.
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap/security/advisories/GHSA-j2qp-rvxj-43vj | mitigation third party advisory |
| https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap/commit/1f7e2ad948c051054b683461885a0215f1806240 | third party advisory patch |