The daemon in Tor through 0.4.1.8 and 0.4.2.x through 0.4.2.6 does not verify that a rendezvous node is known before attempting to connect to it, which might make it easier for remote attackers to discover circuit information. NOTE: The network team of Tor claims this is an intended behavior and not a vulnerability
Link | Tags |
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https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/868-Deanonymizing-Tor-Circuits.html | exploit mitigation third party advisory technical description |
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-February/014147.html | vendor advisory mailing list |
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-8516 | third party advisory |
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-February/014146.html | vendor advisory mailing list |
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33129 | vendor advisory issue tracking |