Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length (and optionally VLAN0 headers)
The product parses a formatted message or structure, but it does not handle or incorrectly handles a length field that is inconsistent with the actual length of the associated data.
This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
Link | Tags |
---|---|
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard/08/ | third party advisory |
https://standards.ieee.org/ieee/802.2/1048/ | third party advisory |
https://standards.ieee.org/ieee/802.1Q/10323/ | third party advisory |
https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/855201 | |
https://blog.champtar.fr/VLAN0_LLC_SNAP/ |