An issue was discovered in GNOME GLib before 2.66.8. When g_file_replace() is used with G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION to replace a path that is a dangling symlink, it incorrectly also creates the target of the symlink as an empty file, which could conceivably have security relevance if the symlink is attacker-controlled. (If the path is a symlink to a file that already exists, then the contents of that file correctly remain unchanged.)
The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/2325 | patch exploit vendor advisory issue tracking |
| https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6RXTD5HCP2K4AAUSWWZTBKQNHRCTAEOF/ | vendor advisory |
| https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210416-0003/ | third party advisory |
| https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ICUTQPHZNZWX2DZR46QFLQZRHVMHIILJ/ | vendor advisory |
| https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-13 | third party advisory vendor advisory |
| https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/06/msg00006.html | third party advisory mailing list |