There's a flaw in OpenEXR's deep tile sample size calculations in versions before 3.0.0-beta. An attacker who is able to submit a crafted file to be processed by OpenEXR could trigger an integer overflow, subsequently leading to an out-of-bounds read. The greatest risk of this flaw is to application availability.
The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number.
The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1939159 | patch third party advisory issue tracking |
| https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=26956 | third party advisory issue tracking |
| https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/07/msg00001.html | third party advisory mailing list |
| https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-27 | third party advisory vendor advisory |
| https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/12/msg00022.html | third party advisory mailing list |