The activation process in Travis CI, for certain 2021-09-03 through 2021-09-10 builds, causes secret data to have unexpected sharing that is not specified by the customer-controlled .travis.yml file. In particular, the desired behavior (if .travis.yml has been created locally by a customer, and added to git) is for a Travis service to perform builds in a way that prevents public access to customer-specific secret environment data such as signing keys, access credentials, and API tokens. However, during the stated 8-day interval, secret data could be revealed to an unauthorized actor who forked a public repository and printed files during a build process.
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://twitter.com/peter_szilagyi/status/1437646118700175360 | third party advisory |
| https://twitter.com/peter_szilagyi/status/1437649838477283330 | third party advisory |
| https://blog.travis-ci.com/2021-09-13-bulletin | vendor advisory |
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28523350 | third party advisory |
| https://travis-ci.community/t/security-bulletin/12081 | vendor advisory |
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28524727 | third party advisory |