Requests forwarded by ReverseProxy include the raw query parameters from the inbound request, including unparsable parameters rejected by net/http. This could permit query parameter smuggling when a Go proxy forwards a parameter with an unparsable value. After fix, ReverseProxy sanitizes the query parameters in the forwarded query when the outbound request's Form field is set after the ReverseProxy. Director function returns, indicating that the proxy has parsed the query parameters. Proxies which do not parse query parameters continue to forward the original query parameters unchanged.
The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.
Link | Tags |
---|---|
https://go.dev/issue/54663 | third party advisory issue tracking exploit |
https://go.dev/cl/432976 | patch |
https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/xtuG5faxtaU | release notes mailing list |
https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-1038 | vendor advisory |
https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202311-09 |