The IEEE 802.11 specifications through 802.11ax allow physically proximate attackers to intercept (possibly cleartext) target-destined frames by spoofing a target's MAC address, sending Power Save frames to the access point, and then sending other frames to the access point (such as authentication frames or re-association frames) to remove the target's original security context. This behavior occurs because the specifications do not require an access point to purge its transmit queue before removing a client's pairwise encryption key.
This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/passpoint | not applicable |
| https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2023-0006 | third party advisory |
| https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/usenix2023-wifi.pdf | third party advisory exploit technical description |
| https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-23:11.wifi.asc |