Kruise provides automated management of large-scale applications on Kubernetes. Starting in version 0.8.0 and prior to versions 1.3.1, 1.4.1, and 1.5.2, an attacker who has gained root privilege of the node that kruise-daemon run can leverage the kruise-daemon pod to list all secrets in the entire cluster. After that, the attacker can leverage the "captured" secrets (e.g. the kruise-manager service account token) to gain extra privileges such as pod modification. Versions 1.3.1, 1.4.1, and 1.5.2 fix this issue. A workaround is available. For users that do not require imagepulljob functions, they can modify kruise-daemon-role to drop the cluster level secret get/list privilege.
The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses.
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
Link | Tags |
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https://github.com/openkruise/kruise/security/advisories/GHSA-437m-7hj5-9mpw | vendor advisory |