Vite provides frontend tooling. Prior to versions 2.9.16, 3.2.7, 4.0.5, 4.1.5, 4.2.3, and 4.3.9, Vite Server Options (`server.fs.deny`) can be bypassed using double forward-slash (//) allows any unauthenticated user to read file from the Vite root-path of the application including the default `fs.deny` settings (`['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}']`). Only users explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or `server.host` config option) are affected, and only files in the immediate Vite project root folder could be exposed. This issue is fixed in vite@4.3.9, vite@4.2.3, vite@4.1.5, vite@4.0.5, vite@3.2.7, and vite@2.9.16.
The product accepts path input in the form of multiple leading slash ('//multiple/leading/slash') without appropriate validation, which can lead to ambiguous path resolution and allow an attacker to traverse the file system to unintended locations or access arbitrary files.
The product uses a name or reference to access a resource, but the name/reference resolves to a resource that is outside of the intended control sphere.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-353f-5xf4-qw67 | vendor advisory exploit |
| https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/13348 | patch |
| https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/813ddd6155c3d54801e264ba832d8347f6f66b32 | patch |