Before Go 1.20, the RSA based TLS key exchanges used the math/big library, which is not constant time. RSA blinding was applied to prevent timing attacks, but analysis shows this may not have been fully effective. In particular it appears as if the removal of PKCS#1 padding may leak timing information, which in turn could be used to recover session key bits. In Go 1.20, the crypto/tls library switched to a fully constant time RSA implementation, which we do not believe exhibits any timing side channels.
The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor, which exposes security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://go.dev/issue/20654 | issue tracking |
| https://go.dev/cl/326012/26 | issue tracking |
| https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/QMK8IQALDvA | release notes mailing list |
| https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/ | third party advisory |
| https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2023-2375 | vendor advisory |
| https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240112-0005/ |