In pf packet processing with a 'scrub fragment reassemble' rule, a packet containing multiple IPv6 fragment headers would be reassembled, and then immediately processed. That is, a packet with multiple fragment extension headers would not be recognized as the correct ultimate payload. Instead a packet with multiple IPv6 fragment headers would unexpectedly be interpreted as a fragmented packet, rather than as whatever the real payload is. As a result, IPv6 fragments may bypass pf firewall rules written on the assumption all fragments have been reassembled and, as a result, be forwarded or processed by the host.
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not handle or incorrectly handles when an additional unexpected special element is provided.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-23:10.pf.asc | vendor advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/09/08/5 | third party advisory mailing list |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/09/08/6 | third party advisory mailing list |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/09/08/7 | third party advisory mailing list |
| https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231221-0009/ |