LangChain through 0.1.10 allows ../ directory traversal by an actor who is able to control the final part of the path parameter in a load_chain call. This bypasses the intended behavior of loading configurations only from the hwchase17/langchain-hub GitHub repository. The outcome can be disclosure of an API key for a large language model online service, or remote code execution. (A patch is available as of release 0.1.29 of langchain-core.)
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize 'dir\..\..\filename' (multiple internal backslash dot dot) sequences that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/PinkDraconian/PoC-Langchain-RCE/blob/main/README.md | third party advisory exploit |
| https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/blob/f96dd57501131840b713ed7c2e86cbf1ddc2761f/libs/core/langchain_core/utils/loading.py | product third party advisory |
| https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/pull/18600 | patch issue tracking exploit |