OpenBao exists to provide a software solution to manage, store, and distribute sensitive data including secrets, certificates, and keys. In versions 2.3.1 and below, some OpenBao deployments intentionally limit privileged API operators from executing system code or making network connections. However, these operators can bypass both restrictions through the audit subsystem by manipulating log prefixes. This allows unauthorized code execution and network access that violates the intended security model. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.2. To workaround, users can block access to sys/audit/* endpoints using explicit deny policies, but root operators cannot be restricted this way.
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
| Link | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/openbao/openbao/security/advisories/GHSA-xp75-r577-cvhp | vendor advisory |
| https://github.com/openbao/openbao/pull/1634 | issue tracking |
| https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2025-14-privileged-vault-operator-may-execute-code-on-the-underlying-host/76033 | not applicable |
| https://github.com/openbao/openbao/releases/tag/v2.3.2 | release notes |